Balancing the trade-off between learning prospects and spillover risks: MNC subsidiaries' vertical linkage patterns in developed countries by Perri, Alessandra et al.
1 
 
 
BALANCING THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN LEARNING PROSPECTS 
AND SPILLOVER RISKS: MNC SUBSIDIARIES’ VERTICAL 
LINKAGE PATTERNS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
 This	is	the	post-print	version	of	Perri,	A.,	Andersson,	U.,	Nell,	P.	C.,	&	Santangelo,	G.	D.	(2013).	Balancing	the	trade-off	between	learning	prospects	and	spillover	risks:	MNC	subsidiaries’	vertical	linkage	patterns	in	developed	countries.	Journal	of	World	Business,	48(4),	503-514.	(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2012.09.006).	Please	refer	to	the	published	version	and	also	note	that	this	version	might	differ	slightly	from	the	published	version. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
BALANCING THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN LEARNING PROSPECTS 
AND SPILLOVER RISKS: MNC SUBSIDIARIES’ VERTICAL 
LINKAGE PATTERNS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
Alessandra Perri 
Ca' Foscari University of Venezia, Department of Management, 30121 Venezia, Italy 
and 
Carlos III University, Spain 
Department of Business Administration 
Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid); Spain 
aperri@emp.uc3m.es 
 
Ulf Andersson 
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Kilevej 14, DK-2000 Frederiksberg; Denmark 
ua.smg@cbs.dk 
 
Phillip C. Nell 1) 
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Kilevej 14, DK-2000 Frederiksberg; Denmark 
eMail: pcn.smg@cbs.dk; Phone: +45 5280 4977 
 
Grazia D. Santangelo 
University of Catania, Italy 
Facoltà di Scienze Politiche 
Via Vittorio Emanuele, 95131 Catania; Italy 
grsanta@unict.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
BALANCING THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN LEARNING PROSPECTS 
AND SPILLOVER RISKS: MNC SUBSIDIARIES’ VERTICAL 
LINKAGE PATTERNS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates local vertical linkages of foreign subsidiaries and the dual role of such 
linkages as conduits for learning as well as potential channels for spillovers to competitors. On 
the basis of data from 97 subsidiaries, we analyze the quality of such linkages under varying 
levels of competition and subsidiary capabilities. Our theoretical development and the results 
from the analysis document a far more complex and dynamic relationship between levels of 
competition and MNCs’ local participation in knowledge intensive activities, i.e. learning and 
spillovers, than previous studies do. We find a curvilinear relationship between the extent of 
competitive pressure and the quality of local linkages confirming our argument of a trade-off 
between learning prospects and spillover risks. Furthermore, the level of subsidiary capabilities 
moderates this relationship.  
 
 
Keywords: Quality of local vertical linkages, competitive pressure, subsidiary capabilities, 
learning, spillovers. 
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1. Introduction 
An important consequence of foreign direct investment (FDI) lies in the phenomenon of 
local linkages, i.e. non-equity relationships that multinational corporation (MNC) 
subsidiaries develop with local firms in their host countries (Chen, Chen & Ku, 2004). 
There is a substantial strand of literature that has characterized linkages’ attributes 
(Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009; Santangelo, 2009; Scott-Kennel, 2007; Scott-Kennel & 
Enderwick, 2004), investigated their antecedents (Belderbos, Capannelli, & Fukao, 
2001; Giroud & Mirza, 2006; Jindra, Giroud, & Scott-Kennel, 2009; Santangelo, 2011), 
and analyzed their consequences (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Holm, 
Holmstrom & Sharma, 2005; Hansen, Pedersen, & Petersen, 2009). This literature has 
recently suggested that local linkages have a dual effect (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). 
On the one hand, local linkages act as channels through which MNC knowledge spills 
over to local firms (Driffield, Munday, & Roberts, 2002; Ghauri & Buckley, 2006). On 
the other hand, they also act as conduits for subsidiary learning from the domestic 
environment (Andersson et al., 2002; Mu, Gnyawali, & Hatfield, 2007; Giroud & Scott-
Kennel, 2009). 
Not all local relationships have the same potential for subsidiary learning and 
spillovers. Building on network research (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996), both sub-
streams of literature on learning and spillovers have suggested that these effects depend 
on the quality of the linkages (Andersson et al., 2002; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009; 
Saliola & Zanfei, 2009; Santangelo, 2009) – to some extent also referred to as linkage 
intensity (Scott-Kennel & Enderwick, 2005; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009) or 
embeddedness (Andersson et al., 2002). Linkages of high quality can be characterized 
by partners’ interdependence, mutual adaptation, and breadth of interaction in terms of 
possibilities to exchange fine-grained knowledge and information (Uzzi, 1996, 1997; 
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Gulati, 1998; Andersson et al., 2002; Giroud, 2003). As a consequence, they are more 
effective than arm’s-length relations for information and knowledge flows in both 
directions. While high quality linkages offer important learning opportunities, they 
simultaneously expose the subsidiary’s knowledge to the risk of spillover to the host-
economy (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Mudambi & Navarra; 2004, Sanna-Randaccio & 
Veugelers, 2007). 
Despite their importance, research on the antecedents of local linkage quality is 
still scarce (Jindra et al., 2009; Santangelo 2009) for three reasons. First, while previous 
literature has analyzed the influence of subsidiary- and sector-specific variables (Chen 
et al., 2004; Holm et al., 2005; Jindra et al., 2009; Scott-Kennel & Enderwick, 2005; 
Scott-Kennel, 2007), the role of the local environment and, more specifically, the role of 
local competitive pressure remains under-investigated despite substantial evidence 
suggesting that local competition is a major element influencing MNC strategy (Alcacer 
& Chung, 2007; Kogut & Chang, 1991; McCann & Mudambi, 2005). 
Second, previous research has failed to investigate how such competition might 
interact with the subsidiaries’ level of capabilities. This is despite evidence in the 
network literature showing that the choice of building and developing linkages depends 
on both firm internal and external factors (Andersson, Björkman, & Forsgren, 2005; 
Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Luo, 2003) and that these 
factors might interact when explaining competitive action (Blanc & Sierra, 1999). 
Finally, most literature on local linkages has focused on less advanced and 
developing economies (e.g. Hansen et al., 2009; Jindra et al., 2009; Santangelo, 2009). 
While this approach increases our understanding of how such countries can benefit from 
foreign MNC activity (Hoekman & Javorcik, 2006; Kugler, 2006), it neglects the 
linkage patterns in developed contexts, where domestic actors are likely to be highly 
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competent, equipped with absorptive capacity, and located in competitive industries. 
These conditions make local firms desirable vertical partners for subsidiaries’ learning 
but, simultaneously, increase the risk of an erosion of competitive advantage due to 
spillovers. 
In this study we address these limitations and investigate the quality of vertical 
local linkages, i.e. of supply chain relationships that foreign subsidiaries build with local 
suppliers and customers (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). We posit that the extent to 
which the subsidiary perceives the local environment as highly competitive as well as 
the level of the subsidiary’s own capabilities affect the trade-off between learning 
opportunities and potential spillovers. In turn, this influences the subsidiaries’ 
investment into their local relationships, i.e. subsidiaries adapt the quality of their 
linkages to these characteristics. Our results confirm our argument. We find a curvi-
linear relationship between perceived local competitive pressure and the quality of 
linkages. In addition, the level of the subsidiary’s capabilities negatively moderates this 
curvi-linear relationship.  
Our study has several contributions. First, we contribute to the recent stream of 
research on local linkages of MNC subsidiaries (Chen et al., 2004; Jindra et al., 2009; 
Santangelo, 2009; Saliola & Zanfei, 2009). We confirm literature that has argued that 
local competitive pressure is an important influencing factor on MNC strategy (e.g. 
Holm et al., 2005). Furthermore, we show that in developed countries, increasing local 
competitive pressure can be positively or negatively related to the quality of local 
linkages because of spillover risks and learning opportunities: it depends on the initial 
level of competition in the host country. This study extends previous literature that 
suggested a more simple effect of local competitive conditions on MNC strategic 
behavior (e.g. Alcacer, 2006; Alcacer & Chung, 2007). It also adds to our understanding 
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of the circumstances under which host countries might profit most from the presence of 
foreign firms (Marin & Bell, 2006). Second, our findings support literature that has 
argued that both firm internal and external factors need to be integrated in studies on 
linkages (e.g. Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009), since they might interact with each other 
(Alcacer & Chung, 2007). In our study, subsidiary capabilities have an important role as 
they moderate the effect of increasing competition. The building, development and 
adaptation of MNC host country linkages is apparently a highly complex process. Third, 
based on our findings, we suggest that studying linkages in developed countries is 
important as learning opportunities and spillover risks increase in such environments, 
thus leading to strong reactions by subsidiaries. This provides a complement to studies 
on emerging/developing countries (e.g. Jindra et al., 2009). Finally, we argue that FDI 
phenomena, such as local linkages, can be better explained by complementing 
traditional economic reasoning with findings from network theory. To this end, we 
confirm that studying the quality of linkages is important (Scott-Kennel, 2007; Giroud 
& Scott-Kennel, 2009). We also add that perceptions of environmental conditions are 
strong drivers of subsidiary behavior. This is an important dimension to study because 
the network-based literature states that the context of business relationships is socially 
constructed (e.g. Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994). Firms react to their 
perceived environment, rather than simply adapting to constraints exerted by an 
“intractable externality” (Astley & Fombrum, 1983; p. 576). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
review the existing research on local linkages, spillovers and subsidiary learning, and 
recall the relevance of quality linkages. We then elaborate on the “trade-off” between 
local learning and spillover associated with quality linkages. Subsequently, we develop 
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and test our model. We conclude with a discussion of our empirical results, the study’s 
limitations, and practical implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Linkages, Spillovers and Subsidiary Learning 
Literature on local linkages has recognized that they encompass two main effects. On 
the one hand, they represent one of the most effective channels for spillovers from FDI 
(Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). On the other hand, they provide the subsidiary with relevant 
learning opportunities from the local environment (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). 
Although these effects have long been investigated separately, integrating both 
mechanisms allows for a better understanding of the local linkages phenomenon. In 
fact, given the interactive nature of linkages, knowledge flows in one way (from the 
subsidiary to the host-country) can be assumed to result in knowledge flows in the other 
way (from the host-country to the subsidiary). Most importantly, spillovers to and 
learning from the host-economy may influence the subsidiary’s performance along two 
opposite directions. While spillovers may endanger the subsidiary’s competitive 
advantage if captured by domestic rivals, learning from local partners is likely to 
improve the subsidiary’s business activities. In order to combine these effects in our 
theoretical framework, it is important to review fundamental literature on FDI spillovers 
and subsidiary’s learning through vertical linkages. 
Traditional FDI literature suggests that the establishment of MNCs’ subsidiaries 
abroad may generate spillovers, i.e. allowing domestic firms to gain access to the 
MNCs’ knowledge (Caves, 1974; Aitken & Harrison, 1999). Over the years, a huge 
array of studies, both theoretical and empirical, has investigated FDI spillovers 
(Blomström, 1986; Globerman, 1979; Görg & Greenaway, 2003; Görg & Strobl, 2001; 
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Kokko, 1996; Konings, 2001; Haskel, Pereira, & Slaughter, 2007). These studies have 
built on the debate on the role of the technological distance between the MNC’s home 
and host economy. In particular, the technological gap hypothesis suggests that a great 
technological distance between home and host country would yield potential gains for 
domestic firms arising from the acquisition of advanced foreign knowledge (Findlay, 
1978). Conversely, the technological accumulation hypothesis relates a great 
technological distance to a lack of absorptive capacity that prevents local firms from 
internalizing and making use of MNCs’ technology (Glass & Saggi, 1998).  
Literature has conceptualized FDI spillovers according to the recipients 
(horizontal vs. vertical) and to the mechanisms through which they take place (indirect 
vs. direct). Horizontal spillovers refer to externalities that benefit the subsidiary’s local 
rivals thus impairing the subsidiary’s competitive advantage. These spillovers are 
unintentional. Conversely, vertical spillovers refer to capabilities and technologies 
diffused either intentionally or unintentionally to the MNC’s local value chain partners 
(Javorcik, 2004). FDI spillovers may arise through both indirect and direct channels 
(Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). Indirect spillovers occur through such mechanisms as 
labor mobility or demonstration effects (Görg & Greenaway, 2003). On the contrary, 
direct spillovers require the establishment of transactional and collaborative 
relationships between domestic and foreign firms and enhance the productivity of local 
firms, such as local suppliers, by increasing the demand of their goods (Saliola & 
Zanfei, 2009) and by allowing them access to advanced knowledge (Spencer, 2008). 
Direct spillovers therefore occur through local linkages, i.e. relationships that involve 
directly the foreign subsidiary with other firms in the host country (Giroud & Scott-
Kennel, 2009). Local linkages may include a multiplicity of inter-firm relationships 
(supplier, customer and subcontracting linkages, strategic alliances, technology 
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development contracts, etc) (Chen et al., 2004). Among them, especially vertical local 
linkages have attracted scholars’ attention, due to their great developmental potential for 
the host economy (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Javorcik, 2004). Vertical local linkages refer 
to direct business relationships that foreign subsidiaries build up both with domestic 
suppliers (i.e., backward linkages) and with local customers (i.e., forward linkages) 
(Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). 
Spillovers are not only considered as a threat to MNCs’ competitive advantage. 
On the one hand, it is obvious that firms want to prevent knowledge from spilling over 
to competitors (horizontal spillovers). This has been emphasized in the early FDI 
literature: MNCs seek to internalize transactions to protect their proprietary advantages 
(Dunning, 1979; Rugman, 1980). On the other hand, another perspective highlights the 
positive role of resources that are shared with vertical business partners (for example, 
see the work on networks as strategic resources (Gulati et al., 2000) and on alliance 
capitalism (e.g. Dunning, 1995)). These streams point out the benefits that firms can 
achieve when they transfer their superior knowledge to their own value chain 
counterparts, for example because of the increased performance of intermediate input 
suppliers (Javorcik, 2004). Accordingly, IB scholars suggest that linkages are often 
characterized by an intention to develop local partners’ capabilities (Giroud & Scott-
Kennel, 2009). Horizontal and vertical spillovers are not independent dimensions of 
linkages. Vertical linkages channel MNC knowledge primarily towards the subsidiaries’ 
direct business partners. Yet, this knowledge can diffuse further and lead to indirect, 
unintended horizontal spillovers. In fact, through their networks of interaction, the 
subsidiaries’ local partners can activate a process of diffusion of the MNCs’ knowledge 
to local rivals (Spencer, 2008). Leakage of knowledge may occur through mediated 
contacts between the subsidiary and its local competitors. That is, information and 
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resources shared within a vertical relationship might be channeled also to other agents 
within the local context (Mesquitas, Anand, & Bruch, 2008; Spencer, 2008). For 
example, a local supplier of the subsidiary could also be a supplier to a subsidiary’s 
competitor. Therefore, when a vertical linkage is embedded in an inter-firm business 
network, the subsidiary’s local partners may act as bridges between the subsidiary’s 
competitive resources and other local firms (including competitors) (Ghauri, 
Hadjikhani, & Johanson, 2005; Gulati, 2007). In sum, while subsidiaries have an 
incentive to promote vertical spillovers through linkages, they need to counteract 
horizontal spillovers that would improve the performance of their local rivals. 
Beyond the fact that local firms might profit from MNC knowledge, extensive 
literature has shown that also subsidiaries may strongly benefit from interaction with local 
partners in host economies. Starting from the “learning-oriented FDI” approach (Dunning, 
1994), several studies have highlighted the importance of learning opportunities offered by 
host locations. Almeida and Phene (2004) report that knowledge linkages with firms in host-
countries increase subsidiary innovativeness. Embeddedness literature has shown that a 
subsidiary’s local network is an asset in itself, since it allows the foreign unit to access to 
distinctive resources that reside outside the boundaries of the firm (Andersson et al., 2002). 
This network represents an important source of competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Collaboration with the local business context positively affects subsidiaries’ competence 
development by providing them with novel opportunities for combining complementary 
assets (Holm & Pedersen, 2000; Moore, 2001; Holm et al. 2005). In a similar vein, the stream 
of literature on “reverse spillovers” points to the existence of technological externalities that 
foreign subsidiaries can reap when operating in the host-country (Castellani, 2002; Driffield 
& Love, 2003). In general, by interacting with local suppliers and distributors, subsidiaries 
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gain a privileged exposure to location-specific pockets of expertise and develop a better 
understanding of the local markets (Chen & Chen, 1998). 
In sum, vertical local linkages have the potential to act as channels for both 
spillovers of the MNCs’ knowledge and foreign subsidiaries’ learning (Giroud & Scott-
Kennell, 2009). However, if this bi-directional knowledge flow is to be fully 
understood, special attention must be paid to the attributes of linkages that allow for 
effective resource sharing and technology transfer (Giroud, 2007; Scott-Kennel & 
Enderwick, 2004; Spencer, 2008; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009; Santangelo, 2009). 
Most of previous research on local linkages has focused on the quantitative dimension 
of the phenomenon. These studies have mainly measured local linkages as the value of 
goods and services that subsidiaries buy or sell in the host country (Belderbos et al., 
2001; Driffield & Noor, 1999; Gorg & Ruane, 1997; Iguchi, 2008; Turok, 1993), or 
through input/output analyses (Girma, Gorg, & Pisu, 2004). The quantity of vertical 
linkages provides information on the benefits from the increased demand or supply of 
products and services FDI creates within host countries (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). 
Researchers have also pointed to the limited significance of this attribute when it comes 
to evaluating the impact of linkages on local firms’ development and subsidiary 
learning (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009; Santangelo, 2009; Scott-Kennel, 2007; 
Spencer, 2008). Network research has produced ample evidence that especially linkages 
of high quality act as a mechanism for knowledge sharing (Uzzi, 1996; Gulati, 1995; 
Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Such linkages are 
characterized by the development of shared vision and co-evolution (Duanmu & Fai, 
2007; Li, 2005). They encompass broad and intense interaction (both at a relational and 
at a personal level) that allows relationship partners to develop trust, and to foster 
mutual problem solving and the exchange of fine-grained information (Uzzi, 1997; 
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Gulati, 1998). Literature on FDI local linkages has recently argued for the importance to 
adopt a network perspective that integrates such dimensions of resource sharing, trust 
and relational interaction, as they allow to better capture linkages potential for learning 
and spillovers (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009; Ghauri et al., 2005). These studies have 
highlighted the need to focus on quality local linkages, suggesting they are complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomena (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009).  
 
2.2 The trade-off of high quality linkages 
High quality local linkages activate processes of bi-directional learning. These allow for the 
transfer of a variety of resources (information, technology, managerial and marketing skills, 
technical and organizational capabilities) that foster product innovation, as well as economies 
of scale and specialization (Duanmu & Fai, 2007; Giroud, 2007). However, they may also 
channel the subsidiary’s knowledge to local competitors, thus endangering its competitive 
advantage. In sum, vertical linkages of high quality are critical for both subsidiary learning 
and spillovers. Hence, they generate a trade-off that the MNC has to manage. We suggest that 
managing this trade-off is crucial for MNCs operating in developed countries. Developed 
country firms engage in substantial “learning effort” especially through heavy investments in 
their human resources’ skills (Liu, Siler, & Wang, 2000). They show a high concentration of 
development and initial commercialization of relevant innovation (Bell & Pavitt, 1997). 
Normally a significant proportion of their R&D is imitative (De Melto, McMullen, & Wills, 
1980; Deiaco, 1992). Developed countries are usually characterized by strong and 
sophisticated demand, as well as by a wide presence of domestic suppliers (Porter, 1990). 
Firms operating in advanced countries have increasingly developed high degrees of 
differentiation and specialization (Bell & Pavitt, 1997) and they are able to provide high-value 
components, machinery, and services. In these contexts, cooperative activities along related 
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and supporting sectors are fundamental (Girma, Greenaway, & Wakelin, 2001; Girma, Gorg, 
& Pisu, 2004; Liu et al., 2000), but local industries also tend to be highly competitive due to 
their advanced institutional environments (Porter, 2000). Thus, local partners’ greater 
competitiveness is not only an opportunity, but also a threat for foreign subsidiaries. On the 
one hand, domestic customers and suppliers possess high-value business and technical 
resources, which make them attractive partners. On the other hand, their greater absorptive 
capacity enables them to internalize subsidiary knowledge and, eventually, to further channel 
it to the subsidiary’s local competitors. This reasoning is consistent with the findings of 
literature on networks that emphasizes the existence of a “tension between the hope to 
acquiring new capabilities and the fear of losing control over one’s resources” (Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Grebe, & Wenpin, 2004; p.808). Accordingly, also the literature on subsidiary-
specific advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Moore, 2001) suggests that subsidiaries aim 
to access location-specific accumulated resources while being committed to prevent the 
dissipation of the strategic assets they bring with them when entering the host economy. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1 The external environment of vertical linkages: the role of local competitive 
pressure 
Local competitive pressure is considered to be a fundamental element of host country 
contexts influencing MNC behavior (Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Kogut & Chang, 1991; 
Holm et al., 2005; McCann & Mudambi, 2005). It can be defined as a situation where 
firms are strongly exposed to each other’s actions and where forces to upgrade 
technology, products, and production processes intensify in the market (Boone, 2000). It 
increases the uncertainty of firms’ relative positions as their advantages and distinctive 
resources are less stable and more difficult to preserve (Cool & Dierickx, 1993). 
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Competition exposes firms to a pressure to innovate (Grant, 1991; Porter, 1990). In fact, 
they are pushed towards upgrading and innovating in an attempt to sustain their 
competitive advantage and gain future market power (Cassiman & Veugelers, 1999; 
Schumpeter, 1942).  
Due to its strong impact on a firm’s competitive position, it is relevant to investigate 
the role local competition plays for subsidiaries’ linkage decisions. Especially in developed 
countries, where high-quality linkages simultaneously encompass increased potential value 
and risk, it is reasonable to assume that MNC subsidiaries are alert to the consequences of 
linkages and that they perceive both learning opportunities as well as the risk of spillovers. 
We assume that subsidiaries located in developed countries are “advanced” agents that screen 
the competitive dynamics and recognize existing opportunities and threats. This is consistent 
with extant research that has documented subsidiaries’ abilities to act on arising opportunities 
and constraints in the host market (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Network theory has supported 
the idea that the environment in which firms operate is socially constructed (Astley, 1984). 
Firms’ interaction with their business network is influenced by their perception of the 
environment itself (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1987; Anderson et al., 1994). Hence, in 
order to understand the drivers of a subsidiary’s strategic behavior regarding its vertical 
linkages in the host-country, it is very important to account for the subsidiary’s perception of 
local competition.  
 
3.1.1 Local competitive pressure and the quality of vertical linkages 
Competition exposes firms to forces that challenge their position in the industry. In such 
situations, increasing the quality of local linkages is a valid response to the 
environmental threat. As outlined above, a subsidiary’s network of local relationships is 
the source of distinctive knowledge and valuable learning opportunities. High quality 
16 
 
linkages also allow subsidiaries to gain access to resources that have competitive value 
(Gulati et al., 2000). Increasing the quality of local linkages fosters the relational capital 
and reciprocity between the partners and it increases the likelihood of joint problem 
solving and improved information exchange (Uzzi, 1997). In addition, a more intense 
involvement into already established relationships stabilizes the subsidiary’s input-
output mechanisms (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 1999). Hence, under increasing levels of 
local competition, fostering the quality of linkages with local business partners helps the 
subsidiary to better handle the environmental threats and to innovate. 
We argue that when competitive pressure becomes too high, subsidiaries may 
perceive a further increase of the quality of local linkages as too risky. Firms operating 
in highly competitive environments are particularly plagued by the risk of knowledge 
spillovers to rivals. In these settings, competitors aggressively seek to imitate the 
sources of a firm’s superior performance (Barney, 1986) in an attempt to destroy its 
competitive advantage. Furthermore, in this context of increased market uncertainty, 
firms’ competitive action, reaction and interaction is highly dynamic and difficult to 
predict (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). As a consequence, even more skilled firms may 
find it difficult to maintain control over their assets, as this would require committing a 
large amount of resources to monitoring activities and implementing thorough 
protection strategies. Therefore, spillovers are more likely to happen.  
In addition, under very high levels of competition, close and interconnected 
relationships with suppliers, distributors, service providers and companies operating in 
related industries are more likely to mediate the process of horizontal knowledge 
diffusion (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). In fact, the turbulence stemming from increased 
competition may harm the general trust and social capital on which the focal 
relationships between the firm and its partners build (Cooke, 2001). This increases the 
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risk of being exposed to opportunistic behaviors. In fact, research also suggests that, 
when knowledge is shared within a non-trust based environment, it is more likely to be 
transferred to third parties who are outside the control of the knowledge source 
(McCann & Mudambi, 2005). Therefore, under very high levels of competition, high 
quality linkages to local partners are riskier since they may act as conduits for 
horizontal spillovers. 
Integrating these arguments, we expect that in presence of very high levels of 
local competitive pressure, the risk of spillover is also very high. In turn, subsidiaries 
are more likely to regard their linkages as increasingly dangerous channels for 
horizontal spillovers. Hence, faced with rising competitive pressures, subsidiaries in 
developed countries will increase the quality of their linkages at a decreasing marginal 
rate and finally even reduce the investments in their vertical linkages to ultimately limit 
the risk of spillovers. Accordingly, Scherer (1965) found that moderate levels of 
competition seem most conducive to innovation, since scarce appropriation 
opportunities in highly competitive environments lower firms’ incentives to innovate. 
Analogously, we expect the highest quality of linkages at moderate levels of 
competition: 
Hypothesis 1:  There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between local 
competitive pressure and the quality of vertical local linkages. 
 
3.2 The role of subsidiary capabilities 
In addition to firm-external conditions, firm-internal characteristics have also been 
highlighted as important factors influencing MNC choice to build relationships (Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999; Luo, 2003; Nell, Ambos, & Schlegelmilch, 2011; Santangelo, 2009). 
More specifically, previous research has suggested that subsidiary capabilities play a 
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role in determining the extent to which subsidiaries develop linkages with their local 
partners (Marin & Bell, 2006; Jindra et al., 2009). We are not interested in such a direct 
effect that a subsidiary’s level of capabilities might have on the quality of its linkages. 
However, we draw on research suggesting that environmental factors and firm-internal 
traits interact when explaining firm competitive action (Blanc & Sierra, 1999). As a 
consequence, we argue that the effect of the perceived level of competitive pressure on 
the quality of local linkages is moderated by how much the subsidiary can potentially 
lose through spillovers or gain in terms of additional learning. This is in line with 
previous literature suggesting that firm capabilities influence firm’s competitive 
strategies under varying levels of host-country competition (Shaver & Flyer, 2000; 
Alcacer, 2006; Alcacer & Chung, 2007). More capable firms avoid establishing 
themselves in regions with high levels of industrial activity because their potential loss 
in terms of spillovers to local competitors would be too high as compared to potential 
knowledge advantages (Alcacer & Chung, 2007). Firms that are already equipped with 
strong capabilities do not ascribe great value to further learning opportunities but they 
strongly fear potential spillovers to the external environment (Arikan, 2009). We 
suggest that this reasoning also applies to subsidiaries’ behavior regarding the quality of 
their local linkages.  
Following Birkinshaw and Hood (1998, p. 24), subsidiary capabilities may be 
defined as “the capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, using 
organizational processes to effect a desired end”. Subsidiaries with high levels of 
capabilities are attractive to their counterparts (Håkansson & Nobel, 2001). Local 
partners of highly capable subsidiaries have strong incentives to learn from them, and 
might seek to build quality linkages to gain access to their extensive set of competences. 
If capabilities diffuse to competitors and become replicable, they lose their strategic 
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value. As a consequence, “firms have every reason to prevent others from accessing a 
valuable body of knowledge they possess so that the knowledge remains rare and a 
source of competitive advantage” (Arikan, 2009; p. 666). In presence of a high spillover 
risk, more capable subsidiaries have much more to lose from relationships with local 
partners than to gain through learning effects because their marginal improvement of 
capabilities tends to be relatively small. We expect that such subsidiaries react to high 
levels of competition even stronger, i.e., the combined effect of high potential loss and 
high competitive pressure makes subsidiaries reduce their investments into quality 
linkages faster and further than if the subsidiary has less to lose because of a limited 
capability base. By the same token, a limited capability base makes further learning, and 
thus vertical linkages of high quality, more appealing for such subsidiaries while the 
potential damage caused by high spillover risks is smaller. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: Subsidiary capabilities negatively moderate the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the local competitive pressure and the quality of vertical local 
linkages. 
 
4. Methods 
For this study, 13 MNCs were chosen from the Swedish OMX ‘Large Cap’ list, 
excluding firms in the financial, insurance, and banking sectors. Our sample includes a 
variety of industries, such as pulp and paper, telecommunications, petrochemicals, hard 
materials, power systems, and equipment manufacturing.1 
Initially, we approached the managing directors of 20 business divisions within these 13 
MNCs since all subsidiaries clearly belonged to one of the divisions. All divisions 
studied were highly international, 75% of them having more than half of their 
                                                             
1 For a full description of the data, see Forsgren et al., (2005). 
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employees outside the home country. In these international divisions, we gathered data 
from 97 subsidiaries located in European countries and in North America2. This resulted 
in a wide range of different locations. Approximately 20% of the subsidiaries were 
located in the home country Sweden often at different sites than the divisional 
headquarters. Five percent were located in the Americas, 38% in large European 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, and UK), and the rest in smaller Western European 
countries including 20% of subsidiaries in Sweden’s neighbouring countries Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway.  
On average, about five subsidiaries were studied in each division, although the 
variance is between two and nine. The divisions’ headquarters assisted in the selection 
of subsidiaries that were representative for the division’s business activities with the 
intention of increasing the possibility of drawing general conclusions. On average, the 
subsidiaries in the sample accounted for over 50% of the divisions’ combined 
operations measured in terms of the number of employees. In 25% of the divisions, the 
subsidiaries investigated accounted for more than 80% of the division’s total operations, 
whilst they accounted for between 10% and 60% in the remaining divisions. The 
number of employees in the subsidiaries varied from 50 to over 5,000. The subsidiaries 
all performed their own production and sales. Product development and production 
process development were important activities in all subsidiaries studied.  
The data used to test the model were gathered through face-to-face interviews 
using a standardized questionnaire. Three different managers at each subsidiary, the 
CEO of the subsidiary, the sales-, and the purchasing manager, were interviewed 
resulting in a total number of 291 interviews. The questionnaire instrument was 
carefully developed incorporating feedback from several academics that identified 
                                                             
2 Note that regression analysis is mainly done with 96 subsidiaries due to missing values. 
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questions being vague, ambiguous or the source of possible bias. The questionnaire was 
also pilot tested on an experienced manager in an MNC not approached in the actual 
study. Subsequently, we modified our instrument in accordance with the feedback from 
the scholars and the manager. 
 
4.1. Measures 
Dependent variable: the quality of vertical linkages 
Following the approach by Andersson et al. (2002), we measure the quality of linkages 
based on four items that capture the degree of interdependence between the two partners 
and the breadth of direct interaction. This allows for the integration of multiple 
dimensions of linkages in order to assess their quality. Interdependence is based on 
three items that ask subsidiary managers to assess the degree of mutual adaptation in 
terms of (1) product technology, (2) production technology, and in terms of (3) overall 
business conduct. Furthermore, (4) the number of functional areas involved in the 
relationship with the business counterpart is asked to reflect the breadth of the 
relationship and thereby the relationship’s possibilities for exchange of knowledge3. 
To derive our measures, we first asked the subsidiary sales and purchasing 
managers to identify the six most important relationships, three with external customers 
and three for external suppliers, that the subsidiary maintains. Second, the respondents 
provided information about the extent of adaptation within each relationship based on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Finally, the sales and 
purchasing managers were asked to state the number of different functional areas from 
                                                             
33 Note that in contrast to Andersson et al., (2002), we aggregate the four indicators to one single factor. This is 
because our exploratory principal component factor analysis show that all indicactors load on one factor. It is 
also justified as our quality of linkages construct is broadly conceived capturing elements of technical 
adaptation, business conduct, and breadth of interaction. 
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which individuals are involved in direct contacts with the specific customer or supplier, 
respectively. These functional areas are the chief executives, the administration, the 
purchasing department, the sales department, the production department (technical 
staff), and the R&D department. For each of the four items, we summed the scores of 
the subsidiaries’ external relationships and divided the obtained value by the total 
number of external relationships. The four resulting subsidiary-level indicators load on 
one single factor (Construct Reliability CR = .85)4. They were used to create the 
subsidiary’s average quality of vertical local linkages. The measure does not include the 
counterpart’s view on the mutual adaptation and interdependence. However, this 
problem should not be overstated since it has been shown that indications regarding 
mutual adaptation from one side of a relationship match the assessment from the other 
side (Hallén, Johanson, & Sayed-Mohammed, 1991, p. 34). 
The advantage of our measure is that it allows for a proper assessment of the 
linkages’ quality. First, the identification of the relationships as well as the assessment 
of the relationships’ attributes is made by the subsidiaries’ managers responsible for 
sales and purchasing. Through this technique, rather than considering the whole set of 
heterogeneous local relationships of the subsidiary, we concentrated on those 
relationships that have been screened by an internal agent who is arguably in the best 
position to assess the relationships’ quality. Second, our four items capture the 
mechanisms that are important to our understanding of learning and spillovers because 
they capture the extent to which a vertical relationship goes beyond arm’s-length 
character. Strong mutual adaption and interaction in many functional areas indicate that 
the subsidiary focuses on and has an opportunity to learn from their counterparts as well 
                                                             
4 Construct Reliability (CR) was calculated as an alternative to Cronbach’s alpha due to the dependency of alpha 
on the number of items. We used the approach according to Hair et al. (2006) taking into account the square of 
the summed loadings and the sum of the error variance terms for the construct. 
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as the counterparts’ possibilities to absorb and learn from the relationship with the 
subsidiary. Mutual adaptation in many important areas, such as product technology and 
manufacturing processes, allows us to depict the extent to which subsidiaries commit to 
and invest in local linkages, upgrading them from simple arm’s-length relations to high-
interdependency ties. The emphasis on the different functional areas involved points to 
the breadth of interaction and thereby the relationship’s potential to function as conduits 
of knowledge flow. Moreover, embracing the idea that the highest-level capabilities of 
the firm are “cross-functional capabilities” that derive from the combination of more 
specialized, functional capabilities (Grant, 2008), it becomes clear that – through the 
interaction with different subsidiaries’ functional areas (captured by our quality linkages 
measure) – vertical partners may have access to the most important competitive assets 
of the subsidiaries.  
 
Local competitive pressure 
To proxy the local competitive pressure, we asked the subsidiary purchasing and sales 
managers to evaluate the extent to which they experience that competitors influence the 
most important customer or supplier relationships identified for the dependent variable.  
We use a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Purchasing 
managers were instructed to rate only the influence on the supplier relationships, and 
sales managers the influence on the customer relationships. Analogous to the dependent 
variable, we aggregate the influence scores at the subsidiary-level, i.e. the scores for 
each of the subsidiary’s relationships are summed and then divided by the number of 
relationships. This results in a perceptual measure of the average influence exerted by 
competitors in the subsidiary’s local environment on the most important vertical 
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relationships that the subsidiary maintains5. This is consistent with our aim to capture 
perceptions of environmental conditions as the true drivers of firm behavior (Boyd, 
Dess, & Rasheed, 1993; Weick & Roberts 1993). Such perceptions would be hardly 
captured through the use of secondary data (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). 
 
Subsidiary capabilities 
It is difficult to objectively measure capabilities. To overcome this limitation, we 
focused on the results of such capabilities (cf. Phene & Almeida, 2008 for similar 
approaches). Subsidiaries that are very capable in one area are often given a specific 
mandate, i.e. the subsidiaries are taking over activities for other units within the MNC 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Thus, as a proxy for the capabilities of our subsidiaries, we 
asked the subsidiary top management to assess the extent to which the subsidiary is 
responsible for other MNC units’ purchasing and sales activities on a 5 point Likert-
type scale. We assume that the higher the level of responsibility for other MNC units’ 
business activities the higher the subsidiary’s capability base (cf. Frost et al., 2002 for a 
similar point regarding centers of excellence). The two indicators load on the same 
factor and we summed the scores to create the proxy for the extent to which the 
subsidiary possesses important capabilities (CR = .72). 
 
Controls 
We controlled for several industry-specific and firm-specific factors. Following 
previous literature on local linkages (Jindra et al., 2009), we included a measure that 
accounts for the type of entry mode and created a dummy indicating whether the foreign 
                                                             
5 Note that the influence items do not capture what kind of influence the subsidiary experiences, e.g. influence on 
price or product development. However, the extent to which the buying and selling activities of subsidiaries are 
influenced by competitors defines – on average – how independent the subsidiary is on direct competitors’ 
actions or if it is dominating the industry. This is what we refer to in our hypothesis development section. 
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investment was made through acquisition. We also controlled for subsidiary size (Scott-
Kennel, 2007) as captured by the number of subsidiary employees, as well as for 
subsidiary age6, measured by the number of years the subsidiary has been located in the 
given location (Scott-Kennel, 2007). Industry-effects have been accounted for through 
the introduction of two industry-dummies. Following Chen et al. (2004, p. 329), we 
split subsidiaries into three groups: high-tech industries, which cover electrical and 
electronics, machinery and precision instrument sectors; producer-driven industries, 
which cover chemicals, basic metals, metal products, non-metal mineral sectors; and 
buyer-driven industries, which cover textiles, food, paper, wood products and leather.  
We also controlled for the geographical distance between the subsidiary and the 
headquarters using the logged distance in kilometers. Following previous literature 
(Jindra et al., 2009), we also accounted for subsidiary autonomy by asking the 
subsidiary CEO to evaluate the extent to which the subsidiary can decide about 
organizational structure, investments, investments in R&D, and acquisitions. We 
averaged the values of the items of this 5-point scale to derive an average measure of 
subsidiary autonomy (CR = .80)7. Table 1 presents the correlations and descriptive 
statistics of our constructs. 
 
----- Table 1 about here ------ 
 
We took precaution to limit potential common method variance. First, as 
described previously, our variables are informed by three different managers, thus 
reducing the risk of one single source of variance. The subsidiary CEO answered 
                                                             
6 Information on subsidiary entry mode, size and age was provided by the CEO of the subsidiary. 
7 We did not chose a list-wise deletion approach in case of missing values for single dimensions but proceeded 
with the simple average. 
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questions regarding the subsidiary’s level of capabilities as well as autonomy. The sales 
and purchasing managers answered questions specifically regarding the relationships to 
the subsidiaries’ most important business partners for a specific product or product 
group, i.e. the mutual adaptation and breadth of interaction, and regarding the 
competitive pressure. Second, our study uses complex constructs based on a number of 
items and our models include quadratic effects and interaction effects. This strongly 
limits the possibility of common method variance (CMV) (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira, 
2009). Thus, we are confident that common method bias is not of serious concern in our 
data. 
 
4.3. Analysis and Results  
To test our hypotheses, OLS regressions were used. To account for the fact that several 
subsidiaries belong to the same division and that their linkage patterns might be 
correlated, we applied the robust cluster procedure8. We checked for the normality of 
the residuals, the absence of multicollinearity, and undue influential cases. We obtained 
an average variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.42 ranging from 1.09 to 2.33. Together 
with the bi-variate correlations all with r < .50 this suggests no apparent risk of 
multicollinearity. We standardized the variable of local competitive pressure before 
squaring it. We used the mean centering technique for subsidiary capabilities to 
calculate the interaction effect with competitive pressure in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. Table 2 shows the results of our main regressions9.  
 
--------- Table 2 about here ------- 
                                                             
8 This was not necessary for several subsidiaries belonging to the same country as intra-class correlations are 
very low and insignificant. 
9 Robustness tests using logged variables and without robust clusters lead to qualitatively similar results. 
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The baseline model (Model 1) explains about 6% of the variance. It shows that 
sub-units in producer-driven industries operate with significantly lower quality in their 
local linkages than subsidiaries operating in high-tech industries. None of the other 
regressors are significant. Model 2 tests the curvilinear relationship between local 
competitive pressure and the quality of vertical linkages. The explained variance 
increases to 32%. Both competitive pressure coefficients are significant (p<.01) with the 
linear effect being positive and the quadratic effect being negative. This supports our 
Hypothesis 1. The effects remain stable across the remaining specifications. In Model 3, 
we add the variable “subsidiary capabilities”. The single effect of subsidiary capabilities 
is insignificant. In Model 4, we add the interactions between subsidiary capabilities and 
both local competitive pressure terms to test Hypothesis 2. The model explains 
approximately 37% of the variance (p<.01). The estimation shows that the interaction of 
subsidiary capabilities with the linear term of competitive pressure is significant 
(p<.05). The interaction with the quadratic term, however, is not significant. This result 
lends support to our Hypothesis 3.  
We have plotted the result for the interaction in Figure 110. Figure 1 shows that 
the overall shape of the curve does not change with the level of subsidiary capabilities 
since the interaction term with the quadratic effect is not significant. However, for any 
level of competitive pressure, the slope of the curve of the subsidiary with higher 
capabilities is smaller than the slope of the curve of the subsidiary with lower 
capabilities. This shows that, at low levels of competitive pressure, highly capable 
subsidiaries increase the quality of their linkages slower than low-capability 
                                                             
10 Note that high and low were defined as approximately ½ a standard deviation above and below the mean value 
of subsidiary capabilities (capability values of +1 and -1). The competitive pressure variable is standardized so 
that these values represent standard deviations. 
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subsidiaries. Furthermore, at higher levels of competitive pressure, highly capable 
subsidiaries decrease the quality of linkages more strongly than low-capability 
subsidiaries. 
 
--------  Figure 1 about here  --------- 
 
The effect of competitive pressure on the quality of vertical linkages depends on 
the level of capabilities that the subsidiary possesses. Furthermore, our follow-up 
analysis reveals that not all curves in our Figure 1 have a “tipping point” where the 
quality of the linkages decreases after a certain threshold level of competitive pressure. 
The tipping point is at competitive pressure levels of 1.8 for low-capability subsidiaries, 
at 1.3 for average subsidiaries, at 0.8 for highly capable subsidiaries. Hence, the tipping 
point of the curve moves to the left (i.e. to lower levels of competitive pressure) with an 
increase of the level of capabilities that the subsidiaries possess. The higher the 
subsidiary’s capabilities, the less competitive pressure is required to make the curve tip. 
For subsidiaries with very low capabilities (0.8 standard deviations below the mean, 
capability value of -1.4), there is a decreasing marginal effect but even under the highest 
levels of competition they will still increase the quality in their linkages as they have 
little to lose, but still a lot to learn. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We analyze the relationship between environmental conditions and the strategic 
behavior of MNCs by focusing on the impact of perceived local competitive pressure on 
the foreign subsidiary behavior regarding adjustments in the quality of linkages to 
vertical local partners. We show that subsidiaries in developed countries adapt the 
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quality of their most important local relationships to the perceived level of competition 
in the host environment and to their level of capabilities. Our findings reveal a 
curvilinear relationship between local competitive pressure and the quality of 
subsidiaries’ vertical linkages and a negative moderating effect of the subsidiary 
capability level on this relationship. 
This paper offers three major contributions. First, we contribute to the recent stream of 
literature on subsidiary local linkages (Chen et al., 2004; Jindra et al., 2009; Saliola & Zanfei, 
2009; Santangelo, 2009). Previous research has paid scant attention to the environmental 
antecedents of the quality of linkages and, in particular, to the role of local competitive 
conditions. We suggest that subsidiaries adapt their local vertical linkages to the changing 
competitive conditions in the host-country in an attempt to manage the trade-off between 
learning opportunities and spillover threats. Our results are consistent with previous work 
arguing that local competition is one of the most critical factors of the host-country 
influencing the strategic behavior of foreign firms (Kogut & Chang, 1991; Blomström, 
Kokko, & Zejan, 1992; McCann & Mudambi, 2005; Holm et al., 2005). Our finding of a 
curvilinear relationship between local competition and the quality of vertical linkages also 
contributes to the stream of literature suggesting a rather simple relationship between host 
country competition and firm strategic behavior. Previous studies (Alcacer, 2006; Baum & 
Haveman, 1997; Cantwell & Santangelo, 2002; Sanna-Randaccio & Veugelers, 2007) have 
shown that firms tend to avoid co-locating or starting knowledge-intensive activities in 
regions characterized by high competition (Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Sanna-Randaccio & 
Veugelers, 2007), i.e. competition inhibits MNCs’ local participation. In contrast, we show 
that local competitive pressure does not always deter subsidiaries’ interaction with local 
agents. Instead it has a double role as the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in competitive 
pressure does depend on the initial level of competition. 
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pressure discourages subsidiaries from increasing the quality of their local relationships 
because of spillover risks, lower levels of competitive pressure make spillover risks less 
critical. As a consequence, additional learning opportunities weigh stronger and encourage the 
subsidiary to increase the quality of local linkages. Firms’ strategic reaction to local 
competition is not univocal as suggested by previous research (Baum & Haveman, 1997), but 
rather varies depending on the perceived level of competitive pressure. Furthermore, we 
highlight that the reaction to varying levels of competition also depends on the extent of 
subsidiaries’ capabilities. In fact, when subsidiaries have very low levels of capabilities they 
will not reduce the quality of their linkages even in presence of very high competition: they 
have nothing to lose, but still a lot to learn. By showing that the complex relationship between 
competition and quality linkages is further moderated by subsidiary capabilities, our study is 
also in line with recent literature arguing that firms’ endowment of resources and capabilities 
has to be integrated in analyses on spillovers and learning (Alcacer & Chung, 2007; 
Santangelo, 2011). Previous research has shown that host-competition and firm capabilities 
interact in determining MNCs’ location choices (Alcacer & Chung, 2007). We add to this 
literature by showing that not only the relationship between competition and location choice 
is moderated by firm capabilities, but also the relationship between competition and inter-
organizational strategy. We also extend previous literature by using a developed country 
context. We find that especially in developed countries the interaction of local competition 
and subsidiary capabilities has a strong impact on subsidiary’s networking behavior as 
subsidiaries attempt to manage the bi-directional flow of knowledge. This substantially 
extends the work on MNC host-country linkages that, to-date, has primary focused on vertical 
linkages in less developed or developing host countries (Hansen et al., 2009; Jindra et al., 
2009; Santangelo, 2009). 
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Second, our study provides support to recent work attempting to enrich the 
traditional literature on FDI (Hymer, 1976; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1980) 
with findings from network research (Andersson et al., 2002; Ghauri et al., 2005). The 
former has compiled substantial evidence on the phenomenon of MNC host country 
linkages, the reasons for firms to invest into such relationships, and their potential 
consequences. We complement traditional FDI literature by studying the quality 
dimension of local linkages and emphasizing the role of perceptions subsidiary 
managers have of environmental threats and opportunities. To this end, we support 
previous literature that has argued for including the quality dimension of local linkages 
as a much better proxy for bi-directional knowledge flows that are so critical for the net 
effect of FDI (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). Furthermore, we adopt from network 
theory a much more socially enriched understanding of economic exchange. In 
particular, network research has established the idea that perceptions of environmental 
conditions drive the behavior of firms (Anderson et al., 1994).  In our model, the 
subsidiaries’ perceptions of local competitive pressure and their own level of 
capabilities help explain their inter-organizational strategy. Thus, we argue that network 
theory offers perspectives that may complement traditional FDI theory, and help 
gaining a more realistic understanding of how foreign firms manage the trade-off 
between potential learning and spillovers.  
Third, our findings have a bearing on the literature on FDI spillovers to host-
markets (Castellani & Zanfei 2006, Santangelo, 2009). This literature has so far 
reported that more capable foreign subsidiaries typically establish high quality linkages 
and, as a result, are sources of potential spillovers to the host markets (Marin & Bell, 
2006; Santangelo, 2009; Jindra et al., 2009). Shifting the context of analysis to more 
developed countries, our study shows that the potential spillovers associated to more 
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capable subsidiaries critically depend on local market competitive conditions to the 
extent that spillovers to the host market may fail to materialize under strong local 
competition. Highly capable subsidiaries decrease the quality of linkages in presence of 
strong local competition to protect their valuable assets, thus reducing the potential for 
spillover. We show that medium levels of competition might provide an optimum level 
for host countries to profit from the presence of foreign MNCs. This result is consistent 
with previous research suggesting that an industry’s innovative output is maximized in 
presence of moderate levels of competition (Scherer, 1965). The mirror consequence of 
this reasoning provides a major insight to the literature on subsidiary learning (Almeida, 
1996; Almeida & Phene, 2004). This literature has regarded the host market primarily 
as a source of learning for the foreign subsidiary (Cantwell, 1989; Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004; Phene & Almeida, 2008). Our analysis confirms this argument only under the 
conditions of low perceived competitive pressure. We find that some subsidiaries might 
consciously forgo the opportunity to learn from high-quality relationships with local 
partners in developed countries. This is because the relative detrimental effects of 
spillovers outweigh the learning benefits.  
 
5.1 Limitations 
Our study suffers from some limitations. First, we do not cover the effects of other types 
of “spillover-controlling” mechanisms, such as formal protection strategies (De Faria & 
Sofka, 2010), beyond the adjustment of local linkages quality. Future research could 
investigate other mechanisms that foreign subsidiaries adopt to defend their knowledge, 
and how these are used to manage the environmental threats. Second, only linkages to 
customers and suppliers are included in our analysis. Yet, despite a certain level of 
underestimation of spillovers and learning from the local context this approach might 
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cause, both effects are arguably affected in the same way thus not skewing our analysis. 
Third, while our focus on the six most important relationships of subsidiaries assures 
that the relationships do bear some level of importance and are thus managed with care, 
we have limited knowledge on the rationale underlying the assessment of this 
importance. However, this problem is not uncommon in other disciplines. For instance, 
ego-centered network studies often ground their empirical analysis on the identification 
(made by the informants) of a number of personal acquaintances or colleagues in order 
to collect information on network density and centrality. The criteria through which 
these acquaintances are selected are rather general and do not seem to be an issue 
(Ibarra, 1993; Morrison, 2002). Finally, our measure of subsidiary capabilities is based 
on subsidiaries’ skills in terms of purchasing and sales activities. Although this is 
consistent with our focus on vertical linkages, it does not include technological skills. 
This is not a strong concern as both purchasing as well as marketing/sales capabilities 
can be important sources of competitive advantage (e.g. Heide, 1994). There is also 
evidence suggesting that technical and marketing capabilities are correlated, as the 
effective management of upstream and downstream markets represents a strong input 
for firms’ technical development processes (Calantone & Di Benedetto, 1988; Moorman 
& Slotegraaf, 1999). Nevertheless, future research could validate our findings in the 
specific context of technological capabilities.  
 
5.2 Practical Implications 
This study bears interesting practical implications. For subsidiary managers, our results 
imply that adaption processes regarding inter-organizational strategies of subsidiaries 
are immensely complex undertakings. Subsidiary managers need to embrace such 
complexity and be aware that inter-organizational strategies encompass both gains and 
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costs, which are driven by a multitude of factors. Inter-organizational relationships need 
to be managed with care, especially in developed market contexts. This requires 
subsidiary managers to be able to scrutinize carefully local conditions and relate that to 
firm-internal capabilities. For headquarters managers, our findings suggest that 
subsidiaries may be able to balance learning opportunities with spillover risks. Thus, 
avoiding FDI in a risky location altogether might be too strong of a reaction. For policy 
makers, it is important to notice adverse selection logics in subsidiaries’ linkage 
behavior. More skilled subsidiaries will shy away from high quality local linkages in 
presence of strong competition and only the less capable subsidiaries will be eager to 
develop close and interdependent linkages with local firms. In this case, the net outcome 
of subsidiaries’ linkages for domestic firms might be lower than expected as the 
domestic firms might face situations in which they share more valuable knowledge with 
foreign subsidiaries than they receive back from them.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Quality of Vertical Linkages 1.000           
2 Entry Mode (1 = Acquisition) 0.068 1.000          
3 Sub. Size 0.124 0.056 1.000         
4 Sub. Age -0.022 -0.169 0.055 1.000        
5 Producer-Driven Industry Dummy -0.120 0.114 -0.080 0.051 1.000       
6 Buyer-Driven Industry Dummy -0.089 -0.244 -0.125 0.184 -0.228 1.000      
7 Geographic Distance from HQ -0.051 -0.011 -0.094 -0.142 -0.317 -0.032 1.000     
8 Sub. Autonomy 0.081 -0.028 -0.080 0.033 0.247 -0.364 -0.060 1.000    
9 Local Competitive Pressure 0.466 0.118 0.098 0.054 -0.025 -0.038 0.026 0.071 1.000   
10 Local Competitive Pressure Squared -0.190 0.168 -0.026 -0.160 -0.199 0.060 0.053 -0.129 0.056 1.000  
11 Sub. Capabilities 0.176 0.046 0.082 -0.008 -0.131 -0.149 -0.017 -0.121 0.058 -0.101 1.000 
 Means 2.796 0.216 684.3 29.9 0.082 0.361 5.605 3.586 0.000 0.990 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.686 0.414 1612.3 27.8 0.277 0.483 2.942 0.990 1.000 1.197 1.913 
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Table 2: OLS regression results for dependent variable quality of vertical linkages.1) 
Specifications  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Hypothesized  H1: Local Competitive Pressure   0.320 *** 0.316 *** 0.274 *** 
relationships    (0.058) (0.055) (0.068) 
 H1: Local Competitive Pressure Squared   -0.151 *** -0.143 *** -0.103 ** 
    (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) 
 Sub. Capabilities    0.032 0.018 
     (0.035) (0.040) 
 H2: Local Competitive Pressure x Sub. Capabilities     -0.101 ** 
      (0.043) 
 H2: Local Competitive Pressure Squared x Sub. Capabilities     0.044 
      (0.026) 
Controls Entry Mode (1 = Acquisition) 0.102 0.086 0.082 0.049 
  (0.168) (0.167) (0.167) (0.195) 
 Sub. Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Sub. Age -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Producer-Driven Industry Dummy -0.488 ** -0.552 *** -0.507 *** -0.536 *** 
 (baseline: high-tech industry) (0.201) (0.145) (0.159) (0.164) 
 Buyer-Driven Industry Dummy -0.097 -0.087 -0.054 -0.108 
 (baseline: high-tech industry) (0.208) (0.154) (0.139) (0.122) 
 Geographic Distance from HQ -0.022 -0.029 -0.027 -0.036 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) 
 Sub. Autonomy 0.086 0.032 0.045 0.021 
  (0.104) (0.067) (0.068) (0.071) 
 Constant 2.650 *** 3.091 *** 3.015 *** 3.159 *** 
  (0.503) (0.350) (0.357) (0.366) 
 Firm-Controls2) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 F 4.72 *** 33.89 *** 34.34 *** 22.26 *** 
 R-squared 0.06 0.32 0.33 0.37 
 Mean VIF      1.42 
1) Unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. Number of observations n=96 except for specification 1 where 97 
observations are used for the estimation. 
2) Controls for potential inter-correlations between subsidiaries belonging to the same firm included in the model (Robust clusters procedures as in STATA 10) 
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Figure 1: The relationship between Local Competitive Pressure and Quality of Vertical Linkages for different levels of Subsidiary 
Capabilities. 
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